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Plaintiff Perfect 10, Inc., has brought this action against Defendants Giganews,
Inc., and Livewire Services, Inc., for infringing upon Plaintiff’s various intellectual
property rights. The Complaint alleges claims for (1) direct, contributory, and vicarious
copyright infringement, (2) direct, contributory, and vicarious trademark infringement,
(3) trademark dilution, (4) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, and (5)
violation of the right of publicity. Defendants have brought this motion to dismiss all of
Plaintiff’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court GRANTS Defendants’
motion in part and DENIES it in part.1 Although Plaintiff’s Complaint is marred by
excessively conclusory language, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated
claims for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement against Giganews. The
remaining vague allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to state any other claim.
Given the liberal standard of Fed. R. Civ. 15, the Court dismisses the remaining claims
with leave to amend.
I.

FACTS

Plaintiff is an adult entertainment company that produces and sells adult
photographs, video productions, and other media. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff derives its
main source of revenue from selling access to adult images displayed on its website
perfect10.com. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Due to the rampant infringement of its products, Plaintiff
alleges, it has been forced to close down its previously well-known magazine Perfect 10
and it no longer earns revenue from merchandise featuring its images. (Compl. ¶¶ 1415.)

1

Dkt. 11.
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Plaintiff owns the copyrights to thousands of adult images, some of which are
registered with the U.S. Copyright Office and some of which are pending registration.
(Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff also owns several trademarks, including “PERFECT 10,”
“PERFECT10.COM,” and “P10” (collectively “Perfect 10 marks”). (Compl. ¶ 19.) In
addition, some of the models featured in Perfect 10’s products have assigned their rights
of publicity to Perfect 10. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that its business is almost
entirely dependent on its intellectual property rights. (Compl. ¶ 22.)
Defendants provide access to an online network called USENET. (Compl. ¶ 24.)
USENET is a global system of online bulletin boards that allow users to post materials
related to a particular topic. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Each bulletin board is commonly referred to
as a “newsgroup.” (Compl. ¶ 24.) When a user posts something in a newsgroup, that
post is called an “article.” (Compl. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges that in one category of
newsgroups, called the “alt.binaries.*” newsgroups, users post almost exclusively pirated
materials. (Compl. ¶ 26.)
Although Plaintiff obscures these facts in the Complaint, the Court takes judicial
notice of the following two generally known aspects about USENET.2 First, many other
commercial providers besides Defendants provide access to USENET. See Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1361,
1366, n.4 (N.D.Cal. 1995) (“Netcom”) (“There is no specific network that is the Usenet.
Usenet traffic flows over a wide range of networks, including the Internet and dial-up
phone links.”); Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F.Supp.2d 124, 129 -130
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Usenet”) (“To obtain access to the USENET, a user must gain access
through a commercial USENET provider . . . or an internet service provider.”). Second,
the content on USENET is primarily user-driven–that is, the content that is stored on a
USENET provider’s server is generally uploaded by USENET users or subscribers. See
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (“USENET is . . . an
international collection of organizations and individuals (known as ‘peers’) whose
computers connect to one another and exchange messages posted by USENET users.”);
Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1366, n.4 (“As a Usenet user, you read and contribute (‘post’) to

2

Courts may take judicial notice of matters of general knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1); see
also, e.g., Sobhani v. @Radical.Media Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1235 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (Wilson,
J.) (taking judicial notice of the content of a motion picture and broadcast commercials).
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your local Usenet site. Each Usenet site distributes its users’ postings to other Usenet
sites . . . .”).
Defendants own and operate websites that sell USENET access for a monthly fee,
starting at $4.99 per month. (Compl. ¶ 24.) The content posted by Defendants’
subscribers and other USENET users, including infringing content, is stored on
Defendants’ servers. (Compl. ¶ 25-26.) Visitors to Defendants’ websites can display the
USENET content from the Defendants’ servers or they may download that content
directly onto their own computer. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Defendants’ service permits their
subscribers to search USENET content for specific files. (Compl. ¶ 24.) For example, a
user interested in finding Perfect 10 works on Defendants’ USENET servers might search
for the term “Perfect 10.” (Compl. ¶ 24.) The search results often yield titles containing
the words “Perfect 10,” “P10,” or other Perfect 10 marks. (Compl. ¶ 54.) In some
instances, the files or images whose titles contain the Perfect 10 marks show images that
are of poor quality, are offensive, or have nothing to do with Perfect 10. (Compl. ¶ 62.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants program their servers to distribute and download
infringing content. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants control which
materials are distributed to and copied from other third party servers. (Compl. ¶ 25.)
Plaintiff contends that Defendants have infringed on more than 165,000 Perfect 10
copyrighted images and that Defendants are aware that they are illegally copying,
distributing, and selling infringing materials. (Compl. ¶¶ 28-29.) According to Plaintiff,
Defendants’ ability to generate revenue is based almost exclusively on demand for the
pirated works contained in the alt.binaries* newsgroups. (Compl. ¶ 26.)
On March 25, 2009, Plaintiff sent a letter to Giganews notifying it that it was
infringing Plaintiff’s copyrights and rights of publicity, as well as the copyrights of third
parties.3 (Compl. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff included with the letter a DVD containing hundreds of
Perfect 10 images, characterizing them as a “sampling of our copyrighted materials that

3

Defendants have attached a copy of Plaintiff’s March 25 letter to Giganews, the DVD that
accompanied Plaintiff’s letter, and Giganews’s response as Exhibits A-C to the Declaration of Ronald
Yokubaitis. Because Plaintiff refers to these documents in its Complaint, the Court deems these
documents incorporated by reference. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff does not allege that it sent any notices to Defendant Livewire.
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your site has offered for sale without any authorization whatsoever.” (Decl. Yokubatis ¶
2, Exh. A.) Plaintiff did not, however, list any copyright registration numbers or identify
any specific article or message on Giganews’s USENET servers that contained infringing
content. (Compl. ¶ 31; Decl. Yokubatis, Exhs. A-C.) Giganews responded that it could
not find the alleged infringing content based on Plaintiff’s notice. (Compl. ¶ 31.)
Giganews further explained to Plaintiff that each article posted on USENET has a unique
message identification number, and if Plaintiff provided the identification numbers of the
articles containing the infringing content, Giagnews would be able to find the specific
infringing material and remove it. (Decl. Yokubatis ¶ 13, Exh. C, pp. 8-11.) Plaintiff
disputes Giganews’s claimed inability to find the infringing images, arguing that
Giganews could have conducted a search using the image identifiers provided by Plaintiff
in its notice and could have blocked any infringing images it found in that search.
(Compl. ¶ 31.).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING A MOTION TO DISMISS

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[A]
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful
in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).
The plausibility standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal requires that a
complaint plead facts demonstrating “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
CV-90 (06/04)
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and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint has not shown that the
pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (internal citation, alteration, and
quotation marks omitted); see Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.
2009) (“[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual
content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a
claim entitling the pleader to relief.”) (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).
To determine whether a complaint states a claim sufficient to withstand dismissal,
a court considers the contents of the complaint and its attached exhibits, documents
incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters properly subject to judicial
notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322-23 (2007); Lee v.
City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must accept as true all
factual allegations contained in the complaint. That principle, however, “is inapplicable
to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court should provide leave to
amend unless it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.
Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted).
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Copyright Infringement

Plaintiff proceeds on its copyright infringement claim under theories of direct,
contributory, and vicarious liability. The analysis of the sufficiency of these claims is
complicated by two factors. First, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the “lines
between direct infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not
clearly drawn.” A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“Napster II”) (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 435, n.17 (1984)). Courts have struggled in particular with the question of whether
a defendant who offers technology that enables third parties to exchange infringing
content should be held directly liable. As discussed infra, courts have reached different
results on this issue.
CV-90 (06/04)
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Second, Plaintiff uses vague, conclusory language throughout the Complaint,
making it difficult to discern what Defendants are alleged to have done, let alone whether
those actions amount to direct, contributory, or vicarious copyright infringement. For
example, Plaintiff alleges Defendants are “illegally copying, reproducing, distributing,
displaying, and selling massive quantities of infringing materials” and that they are
“distributors and sellers of pirated materials.” (Compl. ¶ 28.) Such allegations amount to
no more than legal conclusions that are not entitled to an assumption of truth for the
purposes of a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Neither does Plaintiff
support these conclusory allegations with any facts specifying how Defendants have
copied and sold infringing materials other than to allege that they provide access to
USENET. Are Defendants scanning files of Perfect 10 images and directly uploading
them to USENET? Are Defendants searching USENET for Perfect 10 images and reposting them to newsgroups to make them more widely available? If so, these allegations
are absent from the Complaint.
In its opposition, Plaintiff contends it has adequately alleged that Defendants
committed the following actions: (1) “Defendants program their computers to distribute
known infringing content to other servers and to copy known infringing materials from
other third party servers.” (2) “Defendants select and control which newsgroups to
distribute and copy, and knowingly copy and sell material from obviously infringing
newsgroups.”4 (3) “Defendants have willfully copied, distributed, and sold at least
165,000 P10 Images, without Perfect 10’s permission.” (4) “Giganews sells access to the
infringing material on its servers to Livewire.” (Opp. 7-8.) These recharacterizations,
only the third of which purports to deal with Perfect 10 specifically, are just as
conclusory as Plaintiff’s original allegations and do little to improve upon the Complaint.
The non-conclusory facts the Court is able to glean from these statements are merely
consistent with the allegation that Defendants are USENET providers who sell access to
the USENET content stored on their servers.
Absent more specific non-conclusory facts, the Court can infer from the Complaint
only that Plaintiff is basing its copyright infringement claims on the following
allegations: (1) that Defendants are USENET providers who charge their subscribers a
4

In the Complaint, actually, Plaintiff made no allegation that Defendants “select” which
newsgroups to copy. (See Compl. ¶¶ 25-26, 28.)
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fee; (2) that Defendants program their computers to copy USENET content from other
USENET servers and make this content available to their subscribers; (3) that USENET
is now primarily used by its subscribers or visitors to exchange pirated content; (4) that
Defendants are not only aware of the rampant piracy committed by USENET users but
rely on the piracy as part of their business model; and (5) that Plaintiff has found at least
165,000 unauthorized Perfect 10 images on Defendants’ USENET service. The Court
will premise its ruling on these allegations.
1.

Direct Copyright Infringement

To allege a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement, Plaintiff must satisfy
two requirements: (1) it must show ownership of the allegedly infringed material, and (2)
it must demonstrate that Defendants committed an act of “copying” this material. Perfect
10, Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007). “The word ‘copying’
is shorthand for the infringing of any of the copyright owner’s five exclusive rights”
under 17 U.S.C. § 106. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013
(9th Cir. 2001) (“Napster II”) (quoting S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085
n.3 (9th Cir.1989)). These exclusive rights include the right to reproduce, distribute,
publicly display, perform, or create derivative works of the copyrighted work. See 17
U.S.C. § 106. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have copied, reproduced, distributed,
adapted, and/or publicly displayed works copyrighted by Perfect 10, thereby directly
violating its exclusive rights. (Compl. ¶ 36.)
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged ownership of the
allegedly infringed material. Indeed, Plaintiff has pleaded that it owns the copyrights to
more than 165,000 images that Defendants have sold and distributed through their
service. (Compl. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff has also attached as Exhibit 1 to the Complaint a list of
the copyright registration numbers of some of its photographs. (Compl. ¶ 18, Exh. 1.)
The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the first element
(ownership) of a direct infringement claim.
Whether Plaintiff has alleged an act of “copying” is a closer question. Based on the
facts alleged by Plaintiff, it is clear that USENET users who upload copyrighted Perfect
10 images to the newsgroup infringe Perfect 10’s copyrights. Moreover, it is clear that
copyright infringement is a strict liability tort, making Defendants’ mental state
irrelevant. See, e.g., Educ. Testing Serv. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal.
CV-90 (06/04)
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1999). But it is less clear whether by merely creating and operating programs that
automatically copy copyrighted images in response to the commands of its users,
Defendants can be said to have engaged in “copying” themselves. Courts have struggled
with the question of when and whether ownership of an apparatus or system that
automatically creates copies when prompted by third party users can lead to direct
infringement liability. A leading case in the field, involving claims of direct infringement
against another USENET access provider, provides a helpful analogy: does the “owner of
a copy machine who lets the public make copies with it” commit direct copyright
infringement if individuals use his machine to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
works? Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369.
In Netcom, Judge Whyte answered that question in the negative, and his ruling has
become a seminal opinion in the field. He reasoned that direct copyright infringement
requires “some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s
system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.” Id. at 1370. Because Netcom’s
servers were programmed to automatically copy all content that was posted on Netcom’s
servers–including infringing content–without any volitional act by Netcom, Judge Whyte
held that it could not be said to have “caused the copying,” and thus could not be held
liable for direct infringement. Id. at 1369.
Although the Ninth Circuit has not spoken on the issue, the Netcom principle that
“volitional” conduct is required for direct liability has been widely adopted, including by
the Second and Fourth Circuits. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings,
Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2nd Cir. 2008) (“[A] significant difference exists between
making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying
system, and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys
commands and engages in no volitional conduct.”); CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.,
373 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e conclude that Netcom made a particularly
rational interpretation of § 106 when it concluded that a person had to engage in
volitional conduct–specifically, the act constituting infringement–to become a direct
infringer.”); see also Fox Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. Dish Network, L.C.C. , —F. Supp. 2d
—, 2012 WL 5938563 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (Gee, J.); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d
1106, 1115 (D. Nev. 2006); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F.Supp.2d 492, 497 (E.D. Pa.
2006).
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Notwithstanding these sound decisions, the concept of “volition” can be confusing.
“Volitional” is sometimes understood to mean “intentional,”5 and yet no showing of
intent is required for direct infringement liability. In this Court’s view, the key to
understanding the so-called “volitional conduct” requirement is to equate it with the
requirement of causation, not intent. “Just who caused the copyrighted material to be
infringed?” The Second Circuit’s opinion in Cartoon Network is particularly helpful in
this regard. In the words of that court, “the question is who made this copy.” 536 F.3d at
130. The Second Circuit further clarified that the goal of the inquiry is to “identify the
actor (or actors) whose ‘conduct has been so significant and important a cause that [he or
she] should be legally responsible.” Id. at 132 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser
and Keaton on Torts § 42, at 273 (5th ed. 1984)). Other district courts have astutely
described this element of direct liability as requiring that plaintiffs show that the
defendants must “actively engage” in or “directly cause” the infringing activity in order
to be held liable for direct infringement. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc, 213 F.
Supp. 2d 1146, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Baird, J.); Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA,
948 F. Supp. 923, 931 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (Wilken, J.).
Notwithstanding the wide adoption of Netcom’s so-called volitional conduct
requirement, some judges on the Central District have rejected it. In a recent case, Judge
Feess reasoned that “in light of the fact that copyright infringement is a strict liability
offense, the Court is not inclined to adopt a volitional conduct requirement without clear
instruction from the Ninth Circuit... .” Arista Records LLC v. Myxer Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 109668 at *48-49 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011) (Feess, J.); see also Warner Bros.
Entm’t, Inc. v. WTV Sys., 824 F.Supp.2d 1003, 1011 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (Walter, J.)
(agreeing with Judge Feess’s assessment in a footnote). The Court respectfully disagrees
with the reasoning expressed in these cases and adopts the principle expressed in Netcom,
for several reasons.
First, this Court does not interpret the Ninth Circuit’s silence on the so-called
“volitional conduct requirement” as disapproval. In other Ninth Circuit copyright
infringement decisions involving the Internet, either there was no question in those cases
that the defendant had committed a volitional act or the plaintiffs were not pursuing direct
infringement claims. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146,
5

See Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dictionary 1324 (10th ed. 1996) (defining “volition” as “the
power of choosing or determining; WILL).
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1155-56 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering direct infringement claim against a defendant that
had, inter alia, created thumbnails and cached pages of infringing photos and websites);
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004) (considering only
contributory and vicarious infringement claims because plaintiff abandoned direct
infringement claim on appeal); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019
(9th Cir. 2001) (considering contributory and vicarious infringement claims against
provider of a file-sharing program).6
Next, the court in Myxer appears to have construed Netcom’s “volitional act”
requirement as improperly imposing a minimum standard of intent onto a strict liability
offense. See Myxer Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109668 at *49. This Court does not view
Netcom as having required a heightened showing of intent for the strict liability tort of
direct copyright infingement. Rather, as discussed above, and in line with the persuasive
explanation of the Second Circuit in Cartoon Network, by imposing a requirement of
“volitional conduct” Netcom merely focused the inquiry on whether the defendant
directly caused the infringement to take place. In ultimately holding that the causal
relationship between the copyright infringement and the defendant’s act of merely
providing access to USENET was too weak to impose direct liability, the court in Netcom
did not stray from the strict liability standard.
Turning to the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
not alleged that Defendants were the direct cause of, or actively engaged in, direct
infringement. Plaintiff does allege that Defendants copy all of the material on their
servers from content uploaded onto USENET. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff claims
Defendants store these materials, most of which are infringing, on their servers and
“program their servers” to distribute and download the infringing content. (Compl. ¶ 25.)
In addition, Plaintiff alleges Defendants “control which materials are distributed to and
copied from other third party servers.” (Compl. ¶ 25.) These facts do not indicate that it
was Defendants themselves that committed the act of copying, displaying or distributing
Plaintiff’s copyrighted content. Instead, these allegations are like the similar facts alleged
in Netcom: that Defendants simply programmed their servers to automatically copy,
distribute, and display content, including infringing content, uploaded by USENET users.
To use Netcom’s analogy, Defendants here created virtual copy machines that some
6

The direct infringement analysis in Napster focused on the actions of Napster’s users, not
Napster itself.
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USENET users have used to create illegal copies. Defendants merely engaged in the act
of “designing or implementing a system that automatically and uniformly creates
temporary copies of all data sent through it,” whether that data contains infringing
content or not. See Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1369. Such conduct does not constitute any
volitional act.
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendants’ knowledge of the pirated content on
its servers do not salvage Plaintiff’s direct infringement claim. As the Netcom court
pointed out, “knowledge” is not a required element of direct infringement (although it is a
required element for contributory infringement). Id. at 1370. A participant in the chain
of events that ultimately allows viewers to obtain infringed material does not become the
“direct cause” of the copying merely because he learns of it. Nor is it enough, as Plaintiff
alleges, that Defendants “control which materials are distributed to and copied from other
third party servers.” (Compl. ¶ 25.) An allegation that Defendants control the content on
their servers, without a good-faith allegation specifying how Defendants exercised that
control to directly create copies, cannot alone create an inference that Defendants
engaged in a volitional act directly causing infringement. All owners of internet servers
presumably can determine the content on their servers. To hold that such control gives
rise to a direct infringement claim would create “unreasonable liability.” See Netcom,
907 F.Supp. at 1368 (finding no direct infringement despite Netcom’s ability to suspend
accounts of subscribers and reprogram its system to block certain content); CoStar, 373
F.3d at 556 (holding that defendant’s procedure of screening and blocking photos that
violated its terms of service did not constitute a volitional act of infringement).
Plaintiff relies heavily on Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F.Supp.2d
124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Usenet”) to support its argument that knowledge of infringement
does satisfy the “volitional conduct” inquiry. The defendants in Usenet were USENET
providers who were found to have acted volitionally because, among other things, they
were aware that copyrighted music files were the most popular items on their servers,
they actively created servers dedicated to storing music files, and they increased the file
retention time of newsgroups that shared music. Id. at 148. In addition, the defendants
determined which newsgroups their servers accepted and which they rejected, “routinely
exercis[ing] that control” through “both automated filtering and human review.” Id.
Given these facts, the court concluded that the defendants were liable for direct
infringement, finding that “their service [was] not merely a ‘passive conduit’ that
facilitate[d] the exchange of content between users who upload[ed] infringing content and
CV-90 (06/04)
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users who download[ed] such content; rather, Defendants actively engaged in the process
so as to satisfy the ‘volitional-conduct’ requirement for direct infringement.” Id. at 149.

Like the Usenet court, several other district courts have taken into account a
defendant’s knowledge in determining whether that defendant engaged in volitional
conduct. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. MegaUpload, CV 11-0191, Doc. 16 at *7 (S.D. Cal. July
26, 2011) (Gonzalez, J.) (finding Plaintiff had fulfilled volitional conduct requirement by
alleging that the defendant created different websites to allow users to easily find
different types of infringing media and encouraged and paid users to upload vast amounts
of popular media); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 2009 WL 3364036 at *3
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that plaintiffs’ allegation that defendant’s program collected
and organized links to infringing music files fulfilled volitional conduct requirement);
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F.Supp. 503, 513 (N.D. Ohio
1997) (finding defendants acted volitionally by encouraging subscribers to upload files,
including adult photographs, onto the system).
The Court disagrees with the application of the volitional act requirement in
Usenet, MegaUpload, Capitol Records, and Playboy Enterprises. By focusing on the
defendant’s awareness or state of mind–rather than on who actually caused the
infringement–these cases effectively hold defendants liable for copyright infringement
committed by third parties without requiring a full assessment of the additional elements
of secondary copyright infringement claims.7 As one court has already noted:
[Usenet] held that a policy encouraging infringement coupled with an
ability–but refusal–to stop the massive infringement gave rise to a volitional
act. But this conclusion ignores the language of Netcom and other cases
following Netcom. As the Fourth Circuit put it, ‘knowledge coupled with

7

Plaintiff also cites to New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) and several other
cases that hold that making infringing materials available online constitutes a “distribution” under the
Copyright Act. (Opp. 9-10.) These cases and Plaintiff’s argument in that regard are inapposite. The
question before this Court is not whether posting content online is a “distribution” but rather, even
assuming there was a distribution, whether the Defendants can be regarded as having committed the
distribution, as opposed to, or in addition to, the third party users who actually uploaded the infringing
content onto USENET.
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inducement’ or ‘supervision coupled with a financial interest in the illegal
copying’ gives rise to secondary liability, not direct-infringement liability.
Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2011);
see also Sega Enterprises, 498 F. Supp. at 932 (holding that defendant’s knowledge of
infringing activity is not relevant to whether the defendant “directly cause[d]”
infringement). Accordingly, the Court holds that Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants
actively engage in or directly cause the infringement allegedly committed by their users.
As such, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for direct copyright infringement.
2.

Secondary Copyright Infringement

Plaintiff has also alleged that Defendants committed contributory and vicarious
infringement of its copyrights. Before turning to these secondary liability claims, the
Court addresses the question of whether Plaintiff has adequately pled predicate acts of
direct infringement. “All theories of secondary liability for copyright and trademark
infringement require some underlying direct infringement by a third party.” Louis
Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1104 (N.D. Cal.
2008). Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not met this requirement. The Court
disagrees. Plaintiff plainly alleges that Defendants have “copied, distributed, displayed,
and sold, more than 165,000 Perfect 10 copyrighted images . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 29.)
Although Plaintiff makes no mention in the Complaint of a third party direct infringer
(presumably in a misguided attempt to characterize Defendants as direct infringers), it is
reasonable for the Court to infer from the Complaint that at least 165,000 Perfect 10
copyrighted images were allegedly found on Defendants’ USENET service. That
allegation is sufficient to raise a plausible inference that a third party reproduced those
Perfect 10 works and used Defendants’ USENET service to distribute and publicly
display them.
a.

Contributory Copyright Infringement

A defendant who has not directly infringed on a copyright may still be liable for
contributory infringement if the defendant (1) has knowledge of another’s infringing
conduct and (2) induces, causes, or materially contributes to that conduct. Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007). In the context of
cyberspace, the Ninth Circuit has held that “a computer system operator can be held
CV-90 (06/04)
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contributorily liable if it has actual knowledge that specific infringing material is
available using its system and can take simple measures to prevent further damage to
copyrighted work, yet continues to provide access to infringing works.” Amazon, 508
F.3d at 1158 (citations and quotations omitted).
i.

Knowledge of infringement

In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984), the
Supreme Court ruled that the makers of a device that had both infringing and
noninfringing uses could not be held liable merely based on their “constructive
knowledge of the fact that their customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized
copies of copyrighted material.” The Ninth Circuit thereafter clarified in Napster II that
the knowledge requirement for contributory infringement liability is satisfied when “a
computer system operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system
and fails to purge such material from the system.” 239 F.3d at 1021. The Circuit
explained, however, that “absent any specific information which identifies infringing
activity, a computer system operator cannot be held liable for contributory infringement
merely because the structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted
material.” Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436).
Defendants argue that because knowledge must be of “specific” material, a
defendant must know the copyright registration number and the specific location of the
infringing content in order to be liable. The Court has found no authority supporting
Defendants’ contention.8 In fact, in his discussion of the knowledge requirement for
contributory infringement in Netcom, Judge Whyte stated that “[t]o require proof of valid
registrations would be impractical and would perhaps take too long to verify, making it
impossible for a copyright holder to protect his or her works in some cases . . . .” 907
F.Supp. at 1374. The court went on to suggest that such items as copyright notices on the
8

Defendants argue that Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006) supports their
position. Defendants’ reliance on Parker is misplaced. Parker simply held that where the plaintiff had
failed to “make any mention of specific registered works” when notifying the defendant of the
infringement, the plaintiff could not satisfy the “knowledge” requirement. Id. at 499. The fact that the
court used the words “specific registered works” does not mean that the court held that unless the
plaintiff provided copyright registration numbers the defendants necessarily would lack knowledge.
Rather, in that case, the defendants lacked knowledge because the plaintiff had failed to identify any
copyrighted work at all.
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copies or documentation from the copyright holder would be enough to provide
knowledge of “likely infringement.” Id.
Napster II establishes that the knowledge element is satisfied when a defendant
knows that there has been a concrete incident of infringement of a specific copyrighted
work, and Netcom explains why requiring knowledge of a specific registration is
unnecessary and would be too burdensome. The defendant does not have to be aware of
the copyright registration number or exact location of the infringing content in order for
the knowledge to be specific; it is enough if the defendant has sufficient information to be
able to find the specific infringing content on its system.
In this case, Plaintiff has alleged that it sent Giganews a notice that identified
hundreds of Perfect 10 copyrighted images that Plaintiff had found using Defendants’
service, some of which displayed a copyright notice. Plaintiff also alleges that Giganews
has a search function which Giganews could have used to search for the infringing
content based on the image identifiers Plaintiff provided in its notice. The Court finds
these allegations sufficient to support Plaintiff’s claim that Giganews had “knowledge” of
the content infringing Plaintiff’s copyrights. Discovery may yield facts that could lead a
jury to conclude that it would have been easy for Giganews to find specific infringing
content. Although discovery might reveal that the information provided by Plaintiff was
not enough to identify any infringing articles, at this stage Plaintiff has pled enough facts
to give rise to a plausible inference that Giganews knew of specific infringing Perfect 10
images on its servers.
On the other hand, the Complaint does not adequately plead that Defendant
Livewire knew of specific infringing works. Plaintiff does not allege that it or anyone
else notified Livewire of unauthorized Perfect 10 images on its servers. Thus, Plaintiff is
forced to rely only on its allegation that Livewire knew generally that USENET was used
to exchange pirated content. This is precisely the type of general knowledge that was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Sony. As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
contributory infringement against Livewire.
ii.

Material contribution

Having alleged that Giganews knew of direct infringement, Plaintiff must also
show that Giganews induced or materially contributed to the infringement. Amazon, 508
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 15 of 24

Case 2:11-cv-07098-ABC-SH Document 97 Filed 03/08/13 Page 16 of 24 Page ID #:5308

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV11-07098 AHM (SHx)

Date

Title

PERFECT 10, INC. v. GIGANEWS, INC., ET AL.

March 8, 2013

F.3d at 1171 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts have directly addressed the issue of whether
“[p]roviding a service that allows for the automatic distribution of all Usenet postings,
infringing and noninfringing” could constitute a material contribution to infringing
activity. See, e.g., Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1078; Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1059. In both
Ellison and Netcom, the courts held that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the very
acts of storing infringing copies and providing access to the content on USENET
constituted a material contribution. In this case, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants
provide access to USENET, a system that is now widely known to be a source of pirated
content, and that Defendants’ storage of USENET content on their servers facilitates the
exchange of pirated works among Defendants’ subscribers and other USENET users.
These facts sufficiently allege that Defendants materially contributed to the infringement.
Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a claim for
contributory copyright infringement against Giganews but not Livewire. The
contributory infringement claim against Livewire is dismissed with leave to amend.
b.

Vicarious Infringement

A defendant may also be liable under a vicarious infringement theory “by profiting
from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.” MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. at 930. To prove vicarious
infringement, Plaintiff must show (1) that Defendants enjoy a direct financial benefit
from the infringing activity of its subscribers, and (2) that Defendants have declined to
exercise the right and ability to supervise or control the infringing activity. Ellison, 357
F.3d at 1076.
i.

Direct financial benefit

“Financial benefit exists where the availability of infringing material ‘acts as a
“draw” for customers.’” Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir.1996)). “The essential aspect of the ‘direct
financial benefit’ inquiry is whether there is a causal relationship between the infringing
activity and any financial benefit a defendant reaps, regardless of how substantial the
benefit is in proportion to a defendant’s overall profits.” Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079
(emphasis in original).
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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, who are USENET providers, sell access to their
servers for “as little as $4.99 per month.” (Compl. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff also alleges that the
interest in USENET is now largely centered around alt.binaries* newsgroups and that
“Defendants’ ability to generate monthly subscriptions and revenues is based almost
exclusively on the demand for pirated copyrighted works contained in the alt.binaries*
hierarchies.” (Compl. ¶ 26.) In short, Plaintiff claims that those who subscribe to
Defendants’ service do so primarily because of the availability of pirated material,
including Plaintiff’s copyrighted images, on Defendants’ USENET servers. These
allegations sufficiently establish that Defendants enjoy a direct financial benefit from the
infringing content on their servers.
Defendants nevertheless argue that Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim must fail
because Plaintiff alleges that Defendants charge a fixed fee without alleging that
Defendants “gained or lost subscribers as a direct result of the availability of infringing
materials.” (Reply 8 (emphasis in original).) Defendants rely on Netcom for the
proposition that “[a] fixed fee . . . cannot constitute a direct financial benefit required for
vicarious infringement.” (Mot. 14.) It is true that in Netcom, the court found that a
defendant internet service provider that charged a fixed fee which did not depend on the
nature of the activity of the user did not derive a direct financial benefit from the alleged
infringing activity on its USENET servers. See 907 F.Supp. at 1377. The Ninth Circuit
reached the same result in Ellison, noting, “[t]here is no evidence that indicates that [the
defendant’s] customers either subscribed because of the available infringing material or
canceled subscriptions because it was no longer available.” 357 F.3d at 1079. This Court
declines, however, to interpret either Netcom or Ellison as establishing a categorical rule
that fixed fees preclude a finding of a direct financial benefit as a matter of law. Rather
than establishing a fixed principle of pleading on a motion to dismiss, in those cases the
courts examined evidence already presented by the parties and found no causal
relationship between the fixed fee charged by the defendants and the infringing activity
of their subscribers. Netcom was a decision on both a summary judgment motion and a
preliminary injunction motion. Judge Whyte examined the adequacy (or inadequacy, as
it turned out) of the evidence before him, not an abstract pleading issue. Netcom, 907
F.Supp. at 1377 (“Netcom receives a fixed fee. There is no evidence that infringement by
Erlich, or any other user of Netcom’s services, in any way enhances the value of
Netcom’s services to subscribers or attracts new members.”). Ellison, too, was an appeal
from a summary judgment ruling, not a motion to dismiss. Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079
(“While a causal relationship might exist between AOL’s profits from subscriptions and
CV-90 (06/04)
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the infringing activity taking place on its USENET servers, Ellison has not offered
enough evidence for a reasonable juror so to conclude.”). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit in
Ellison explicitly noted the possibility that some fixed-fee services could be construed as
receiving a direct financial benefit for purposes of vicarious infringement:
Congress cautions courts that “receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat
periodic payments for service . . . [ordinarily] would not constitute
receiving a ‘financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity.’ ” S. Rep. 105-190, at 44. But “where the value of the service
lies in providing access to infringing material,” courts might find
such “one-time set-up and flat periodic” fees to constitute a direct
financial benefit. Id. at 44-45. Thus, the central question of the “direct
financial benefit” inquiry in this case is whether the infringing activity
constitutes a draw for subscribers, not just an added benefit.
Id. at 1079 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff alleges that USENET is now used primarily for pirated content and that
the availability of the pirated content is what attracts most of Defendants’ monthly
customers. (Compl. ¶ 26.) (“Defendants’ ability to generate monthly subscriptions and
revenues is based almost exclusively on the demand for pirated copyrighted works
contained in the alt.binaries* hierarchies.”). In other words, Defendants allegedly charge
a fixed fee for a service that mainly exists to provide access to the infringing material on
USENET. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must accept these allegations as true.
Thus, Plaintiff has properly alleged that the fixed fee charged by Defendants is a direct
financial benefit.
ii.

Control

The “control” element of the vicarious liability test is determined by the
defendant’s “right and ability to supervise the direct infringer.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930
n.9. “[A] defendant exercises control over a direct infringer when he has both a legal
right to stop or limit the directly infringing conduct, as well as the practical ability to do
so.” Amazon, 508 F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007). “The ability to block infringers’
access to a particular environment for any reason whatsoever is evidence of the right and
ability to supervise.” Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023.
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Defendant Giganews has attached the terms of use for Giganews as an exhibit to its
motion.9 The terms of use clearly state that Giganews has the power to suspend and
cancel the accounts of its users. (Decl. Kearney, Exh. A, pp. 5-6.) In addition, as the
Court has already discussed, Plaintiff alleges that Giganews can easily find unauthorized
Perfect 10 images on its servers by using its search function. Based on these facts and
allegations, Plaintiff has satisfied the “control” element with respect to Giganews
subscribers.
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts, however, showing what control Giganews exerts
over USENET users who are not Giganews subscribers. Nor does Plaintiff allege that
Livewire has any power over third party infringers. Thus, Plaintiff has stated a claim for
vicarious liability against Giganews for copyright infringement committed by Giganews
subscribers only. The vicarious copyright claim against Livewire is dismissed with leave
to amend.
B.

Trademark Claims

Plaintiff raises three trademark claims: direct infringement, secondary
infringement, and trademark dilution. The Court concludes that none of these causes of
action has been pled adequately.
1.

Direct Trademark Infringement

In order to state a valid claim of direct trademark infringement, Plaintiff must
allege that Defendants “used” their mark “in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such
use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive... .” 15 U.S.C. §
1114(1)(a). In their motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not alleged
that they used Perfect 10’s marks in connection with the sale or advertising of any good
or service. In response, Plaintiff points to the following allegations in its complaint:
Defendants have copied and sold 165,000 images, many of which bear Perfect 10’s marks

9

Defendants ask the court to incorporate the terms of use by reference, arguing that they
demonstrate Giganews’s commitment to stopping copyright infringement. (Mot. at 3). Plaintiff does
not object.
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(Compl. ¶ 29); Defendants allow their users to use Perfect 10 marks to conduct searches
(Compl. ¶ 24); and when a user searches for one of Perfect 10’s works, Defendants
provide search results containing Perfect 10’s marks in the title (Compl. ¶ 54).
Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have “sold” works bearing the Perfect
10 mark to their users, nowhere does Plaintiff allege that Defendants were paid for the
images that their users could obtain through access to USENET. Rather, the fees that
Defendants receive result from their providing access to a wide variety of content,
including some content that bears Plaintiff’s marks and other content that does not.
Plaintiff fails to explain how Defendants’ service constitutes the “use” of the Perfect 10
mark in the sale or marketing of a good or service. Nor has Plaintiff cited any authority to
support the proposition that providing access to a forum where content bearing a
trademark may be obtained constitutes “use” of that mark within the meaning of
§ 1114(1)(a).
Moreover, Defendants do not “use” Plaintiff’s marks in a commercial transaction
by merely offering a search function that allows third parties to search for images using
Plaintiff’s marks as search terms. The Court is unaware of any authority that would
support such a broad construction of direct trademark infringement law, and Plaintiff
does not cite any. Direct infringement requires that the defendant itself “use” the mark; it
is insufficient for direct infringement purposes to allege that a defendant allows third
parties to use the mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). Accordingly, the Court dismisses
Plaintiff’s direct trademark infringement claim.
2.

Secondary Trademark Infringement Claims

Plaintiff has also alleged claims for contributory and vicarious trademark
infringement in violation of Sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act. Plaintiff’s secondary
trademark infringement claims fail because Plaintiff has failed to allege an underlying act
of direct trademark infringement by a third party. “All theories of secondary liability” for
trademark infringement “require some underlying direct infringement by a third party.”
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1104 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir.
2007)). According to the Ninth Circuit, “trademark infringement law prevents only
unauthorized uses of a trademark in connection with a commercial transaction in which
the trademark is being used to confuse potential consumers.” Bosley Medical Institute,
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Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff’s Complaint is bereft of any
allegations that a third party used Plaintiff’s marks in connection with a commercial
transaction. Plaintiff has not alleged, for example, that any of Defendants’ subscribers
used Defendants’ USENET service to sell products bearing Plaintiff’s marks. To the
contrary, Plaintiff alleges that customers are drawn to Defendants’ USENET service
because it offers the ability to view infringing products for free.10 See Bosley Medical,
403 F.3d at 677 (“[T]rademark infringement protects only against mistaken purchasing
decisions and not against confusion generally.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Because Plaintiff has not pled that any third party user used a Perfect 10
trademark in connection with a commercial transaction, its secondary trademark
infringement claims fail.
3.

Trademark Dilution

In order to state a trademark dilution claim, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) the
mark is famous and distinctive; (2) the defendant is making use of the mark in
commerce; (3) the defendant’s use began after the mark became famous; and (4) the
defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment.” Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus,
like a claim for direct trademark infringement, a trademark dilution claim is premised on
the conduct of the defendant–i.e., his “use” of the mark–and not on the acts of third
parties.
Plaintiff’s trademark dilution claim suffers the same flaw as its direct trademark
infringement claim: Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants have “used” Plaintiff’s
protected marks. Plaintiff’s sole factual allegation in support of this claim is that
“Defendant’s [sic] provide their users with files or groups of images whose names
contain [Perfect 10] marks, which either intermingle Perfect 10’s high-quality images
with images of poor-quality or of an offensive or illegal nature owned by third parties, or
provide solely low quality explicit images that have nothing to do with Perfect 10.”
(Compl. ¶ 62). Notably, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants themselves

10

In contrast, in Visa Perfect 10 did plead an underlying act of direct infringement by third
parties: it alleged that certain webistes had sold images bearing its marks. Visa, 494 F.3d 788, 807-08.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit rejected Perfect 10’s secondary trademark infringement claims on other
grounds. Id.
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intermingled or degraded Plaintiff’s marks; rather, Plaintiffs merely allege that
Defendants have provided access to files and images (created by third parties) that
degrade the marks. Without any such allegation, Plaintiff’s claim for trademark dilution
fails as well.
C.

State Law Claims and Preemption under the Communications Decency
Act

Finally, Plaintiff asserts claims under California law for violation of the rights of
publicity assigned to it and for violation of the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”).
Defendants argue that the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) provides them with
immunity against these claims. The Court agrees with Defendants and dismisses these
claims.
Under the CDA, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.” 47 U.S.C § 230(c)(1). In this case, Plaintiff does not dispute that
Defendants are providers of an “interactive computer service.” In Perfect 10, Inc. v.
CCBill LLC, a case involving Plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit held that the CDA establishes
“broad federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable
for information originating with a third-party user of the service” and expressly preempts
conflicting state laws. 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007).11
Thus, the CDA provides Defendants immunity from state-law claims based on
“information originating with a third-party user of the service.” See CCBill LLC, 488
F.3d at 1118. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s California law claims fall within this
definition. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants allegedly violated the publicity rights of
certain Perfect 10 models, which rights have been assigned to Perfect 10, by making
available search results containing the models’ names and providing images, including
explicit or offensive images, that were not of the model. (Compl. ¶ 74.) Plaintiff also
11

The CDA’s grant of immunity is limited by § 230(e)(2), which prohibits courts from
construing the CDA to “limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.” Id. In CCBill,
however, the Ninth Circuit construed this exception to CDA immunity as applying only to claims arising
under “federal intellectual property” laws. Id. at 1119. Consequently, the Circuit held the defendants
were eligible for immunity under the CDA for the California right of publicity and UCL claims at issue
in that case. Id.
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claims Defendants have violated the UCL by, inter alia, (1) “offering for free” adultoriented content without purchasing expensive licenses, thereby making it impossible for
businesses like Perfect 10 that actually purchase these licenses to compete; and (2)
infringing and diluting Perfect 10’s marks and the trademarks of others. (Compl. ¶¶ 6566.) All of these allegations are based on the actions of third party USENET users, not
Defendants.12 Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants themselves used the names of
Perfect 10 models to mislabel image files or that they posted unlicensed content onto
USENET. Accordingly, under CCBill, Plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted by the
CDA.
The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that CDA immunity does not apply
because Defendants, in addition to being “provider[s] of an interactive computer service,”
are also “information content provider[s].” See § 230(c)(1). An “information content
provider,” defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development” of the offending content, is not entitled to CDA immunity. See
47 U.S.C. § 203(f)(3). To support this argument, Plaintiff relies on Fair Housing
Counsel of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008),
in which the Ninth Circuit held that an online roommate-matching service was not
entitled to CDA immunity for certain California discrimination claims. In that case, the
defendant’s website required its users to divulge their sex, family status, and sexual
orientation, information that third parties allegedly used to discriminate in roommate
selection. Id. at 1164. Because it was the defendant who created the questions that
elicited that information, the Ninth Circuit held that even though the answers were
ultimately selected by third party users, the defendant itself was “undoubtedly the
‘information content provider’ as to the questions” and thus could claim no immunity
under the CDA. Id. Despite its reliance on Roommates, Plaintiff does not point to any
allegation in the complaint that Defendants contributed to the creation or development of

12

The only allegation in support of Plaintiff’s UCL claim that can be directly attributed to
Defendants is that Defendants have multiple websites that sell access to the same USENET content.
(Compl. ¶ 67.) Plaintiff claims Defendants offer these websites “hoping” that consumers will purchase
multiple memberships without knowing that they provide access to the same content. (Id.) However,
Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a UCL claim based on this allegation. To state a UCL claim, Plaintiff
must allege that it has “suffered an injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of the unfair
competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. Plaintiff does not specify how Defendants’ multiple
websites have caused it injury. Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim based on this allegedly deceptive
practice.
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the offending content. Roommates makes clear that if a defendant passively displays
content created entirely by a third party, CDA immunity applies, even if the defendant’s
service made it possible to display the content in the first place. Id. at 1173-74. Nor has
Plaintiff alleged that Defendants have required third parties to create or develop
infringing content as a condition of its service, in contrast to the defendant in Roommates.
Thus, Plaintiff has not established that Defendants are “information content providers”
who lack CDA immunity. Because the CDA shields Defendants against Plaintiff’s statelaw claims, those claims are dismissed.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged claims for contributory
and vicarious copyright infringement against Defendants Giganews. All other claims are
dismissed. In accordance with the liberal policies of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, leave to amend is
granted for all claims except the state law claims. The amended complaint must be filed
no later than 14 days from the date of this order.
The Court notes that in defending its claims, Plaintiff has done little more than
recite and at times exaggerate the conclusory allegations in its Complaint. If Plaintiff
does choose to amend, Plaintiff is admonished not to use the same vague and conclusory
language that plagued the original Complaint.
:
Initials of Preparer
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